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Abstract
We study the role of the strength of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) law protec-
tion and enforcement in influencing horizontal productivity spillovers from inward 
FDI to domestic firms in host countries. While most WTO countries adopted strong 
IPR legislation due to exogenous pressure resulting from the signing of the Trade-
Related Aspects of IPR (TRIPS) agreement, public IPR enforcement strength con-
tinues to vary significantly between countries. We meta-analyse 49 studies and find 
that public IPR enforcement strength has a direct positive effect on horizontal pro-
ductivity spillovers from inward FDI to domestic firms and a negative moderating 
effect on the relationship between IPR law protection strength and horizontal pro-
ductivity spillovers from inward FDI to domestic firms.
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1 Introduction
This study investigates the role of national Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) sys-
tems and particularly the strength of IPR law protection and the effectiveness of 
public IPR enforcement (e.g., judiciary, customs) in stimulating horizontal pro-
ductivity spillovers from inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to domestic 
firms. The strength of a host country’s IPR system can determine the level of IPR 
risk that foreign Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) face when investing in the 
country and an MNEs decision to engage in the transfer of technological assets to 
a local subsidiary, invest in R&D activities, and license its IPR to domestic com-
panies (Branstetter et  al. 2007; de Faria and Sofka 2010; Smarzynska-Javorcik 
2004a). Foreign MNEs strive to avoid having their IPR infringed in a host country 
since this can enable the domestic competitors to upgrade their capabilities while 
escaping heavy investments in R&D (Cappelli et al. 2014; Liang 2017). Foreign 
MNEs therefore are more likely to transfer high value technological IPR assets in 
countries where IPR protection is strong and public enforcement is effective. This 
in turn will impact the productivity of domestic firms through technology licens-
ing and/or spillovers via e.g., observation and imitation (Berry 2017; Pavlínek 
and Žížalová 2014). The strength of the IPR system of a host country is gen-
erally expected to determine the extent to which domestic firms can access and 
exploit the IPR assets of foreign MNEs and the degree to which foreign MNEs 
can efficiently appropriate the economic returns from their innovations (deFaria 
and Sofka 2010; Teece 1986; Zhao 2006).
The strength of IPR systems depends on two distinct elements of a country’s 
institutional environment, the strength of IPR law protection and the effectiveness 
of public IPR enforcement (Peng et al. 2017a). Existing studies on the effect of 
national IPR systems on inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domes-
tic firms however, focus solely on the effect of IPR law protection (Arora 2009) 
and are therefore likely to suffer from biased results. Studies ignoring the effect of 
the strength of public IPR enforcement are likely to systematically overestimate 
the effect of IPR law protection strength (Papageorgiadis and Sofka 2020). This 
could also explain the mixed results in the existing literature, such as the finding 
of negative (Iršová and Havránek 2013), positive (Yi et al. 2015), and insignifi-
cant (Smeets and de Vaal 2016) effects on FDI horizontal productivity spillovers 
from inward FDI. Focusing on only one element of IPR systems in their empirical 
modelling but arguing for the importance of IPR systems overall, existing studies 
de facto assumed that both IPR law protection and the effectiveness of public IPR 
enforcement developed equally over time and have a uniform effect on inward 
FDI horizontal productivity spillovers. This leads to biased estimates of the effect 
of IPR law protection in each respective study and the mixed findings across stud-
ies and hence handicaps research narratives of the impact of IPR protection on 
inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms.
The contemporary context of IPR systems internationally after the signing of 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement in 
1995 is substantially different to the way it is theorized in the existing literature. 
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Although most countries have significantly increased the availability of IPR law 
protection in their IPR systems after TRIPS, the effectiveness with which the IPR 
laws and legal mechanisms are enforced in practice by public authorities con-
tinues to be questionable for many countries (Athreye et  al. 2020; Papageorgi-
adis and McDonald 2019; Peng et  al. 2017a, 2017b). This is because although 
the TRIPS agreement requires signatory countries to provide a number of specific 
legislative procedures in relation to enforcement mechanisms, it does not set any 
obligations/requirements regarding how effectively IPR laws are enforced by rel-
evant public agents in practice (WTO 2017). Therefore, while most WTO coun-
tries nowadays offer IPR law protection that is generally comprehensive (Park 
2008; Peng et  al. 2017a), the levels of effectiveness of public IPR enforcement 
continue to vary significantly between countries (Brander et al. 2017; Papageorgi-
adis and McDonald 2019).
In this paper we contribute to the literature by integrating the public IPR enforce-
ment element into the study of the effect of IPR systems on horizontal productivity 
spillovers from inward FDI to domestic firms. We do so by building on and extend-
ing the meta-analytical databases of horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic 
firms from inward FDI and approaches developed by Meyer and Sinani (2009) and 
Iršová and Havránek (2013). First, we introduce in the established theoretical and 
empirical frameworks the distinct effect of the strength of public IPR enforcement 
element of IPR institutions on horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI 
to domestic firms. The incorporation of the public enforcement element of IPR sys-
tems allows us to disentangle the effect of IPR enforcement from that of IPR law 
protection on horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI. We find that both 
the strength of public IPR enforcement and IPR law protection have a significant 
positive effect on horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI. This finding 
confirms the importance of considering the distinctive direct effect of public IPR 
enforcement strength on horizontal spillovers from inward FDI and international 
technology transfer, as accentuated by Arora (2009), Maskus (2004), and Brander 
et al. (2017).
Second, we contribute to the literature by conceptualizing and identifying the 
moderating role of public IPR enforcement strength on the effect that the strength 
of IPR law protection has on the horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI 
to domestic firms. Our empirical finding reveals that the effectiveness of public IPR 
enforcement has a negative moderating effect, indicating that in countries where 
both IPR law protection and public IPR enforcement are strong, the domestic firms 
may experience less horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI because for-
eign firms are able to exercise market power and stifle the competition from domes-
tic firms (Fisher and Oberholzer-Gee 2013). This finding suggests that the diverg-
ing assertions and empirical findings of the previous studies probably relate to the 
uncaptured indirect effect of the second element of IPR systems in those studies. By 
identifying this distinctive moderating role of the strength of public IPR enforcement 
on the effect of the strength of IPR law protection, we gather important implications 
for policy making. The strengthening of both IPR law protection and public IPR 
enforcement in a host country are expected to boost horizontal productivity spillo-
vers from inward FDI to domestic firms. However, policy makers need to monitor 
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closely the strengthening of IPR protection and enforcement in their country and 
seek to timely identify when the productivity spillovers start to be hindered by the 
potential existence of a technological monopoly of MNEs. This can be done through 
the monitoring of the overall functioning of specific industries by e.g., monitoring 
the number of IPRs owned by MNEs, large firms or/and business groups and the 
number of IPR litigation cases taking place within an industry. It can also be done 
by reducing the strength of IPR law protection (e.g., shorten the protection period) 
in areas where moderate protection is expected to be more conducive for innovation 
and firm productivity growth (Brander et al. 2017) or increasing the maintenance fee 
for patents that are not practiced, but owned for pre-emptive purposes.
2  Background to IPR Systems
IPR systems comprise of two distinct elements: (a) IPR protection and (b) public IPR 
enforcement (Khoury et  al. 2014; Peng et  al. 2017a). The IPR protection element 
relates to the availability of IPR law as this appears in the statutes of a country’s 
legislative framework. The range of IPR law in a country determines which intel-
lectual assets can receive IPR protection, the duration of IPR protection (e.g., typi-
cally 20 years for patents) and the available legal sanctions that can be used by IPR 
enforcement agents (OECD 2014). For example, IPR law in a country determines 
the level and range of fines that IPR infringers may be sentenced with if convicted 
for IPR violation. Countries offering strong IPR protection generally provide legisla-
tive frameworks that offer IPR protection coverage to a wide type of IPR assets and 
a wide number of legal enforcement mechanisms for use by the IPR enforcement 
agents (Ginarte and Park 1997). In contrast, weak IPR law protection relates to the 
provision of some IPR protection however, protection may not be available for many 
other types of IPR that receive protection in other countries. There are differences 
in the availability and range of IPR law protection between countries internationally 
such as country specific legal exemptions or lack of IPR law availability for specific 
IPR assets e.g., the patentability of software and plant and animal varieties (Park 
2008). Therefore, while IPR owners may be awarded IPR protection in one country 
they may not be able to register and protect their rights in another country. In addi-
tion, the available laws related to the enforcement of IPR may not provide a range of 
legal options to IPR enforcement agents to carry out their operations effectively. For 
example, this can relate to the potential lack of legislation that allows IPR enforce-
ment agents to award and enforce preliminary injunctions in IPR infringement cases.
The way that law is enforced (or not) in practice is distinct to the existence of 
law on the books since enforcement depends on the behaviour of public agents 
(Dixit 2009). While IPR law in a country is codified and evidenced in writing in the 
legislative books of its IPR system, it is subject to the interpretation of the judici-
ary and other public IPR enforcement agents such as customs, police and trading 
standards. This is because the application of IPR law in practice is at the discre-
tion of IPR enforcement agents who are bounded by the legislative norms of their 
perspective country (Hebert and McLemore 1973). The extent to which the public 
IPR enforcement agents will effectively engage and enforce IPR will be influenced 
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by their ‘shared sets of beliefs’ about IPR infringement and if they consider an IPR 
infringing activity to be illegal. Also, even if the IPR legislative framework in a host 
country includes laws that enable punitive sanctions to IPR infringers, these may 
never be utilized by the judiciary or not enforced in practice by the customs offi-
cials. The same IPR laws available in two different countries may be applied differ-
ently depending on the way that the IPR law is decoded and interpreted by the IPR 
enforcement agents of the country (e.g., punitively in one country and non-puni-
tively in another). Strong public IPR enforcement is expected to prevail in countries 
where public IPR enforcement agents effectively prosecute IPR infringement and 
judiciary independently and transparently apply IPR law in practice (Pajunen 2008). 
In contrast, weak public IPR enforcement is expected to be witnessed in countries 
with opaque, arbitrary and ineffective judiciary and enforcement authorities who 
are more receptive to corrupt practices and/or unlikely to enforce the IPR laws in 
practice because of lack of legislative/social norms conducive to law enforcement 
(Maskus 2004).
Distinguishing between the strength of IPR law protection and the strength of 
public IPR enforcement in a country is particularly important in the years after the 
implementation of the TRIPS agreement. The TRIPS agreement entered into force 
in 1995 and set the minimum standards for IPR law protection among the member 
countries of the WTO (WTO 2017). The implementation of the TRIPS agreement 
brought a significant change to the availability of IPR law protection in the legisla-
tive framework of WTO member countries (Alexiou et al. 2016). However, TRIPS 
did not set obligations for WTO countries regarding the effectiveness with which 
IPR law is enforced by public enforcement agents (Maskus 2015). It should be also 
noted that while the WTO signatory countries now have legislative frameworks that 
offer a wide range of available IPR legislation, there is a mismatch between the new 
TRIPS required IPR laws and the dominant norms towards IPR in countries where 
the strengthening of IPR laws was largely a result of external political pressure and 
not due to internal forces (Brander et al. 2017). This mismatch leads to the ineffec-
tive enforcement of the law by public IPR enforcement agents in practice. This is the 
case for countries like China, where it is generally acclaimed that its IPR law pro-
tection framework is well crafted, however the actual enforcement of IPR by public 
agents in the country is weak (Peng et al. 2017b). The mismatch has become par-
ticularly evident in the years after TRIPS, when the gap between the strength of IPR 
protection and the effectiveness of public IPR enforcement emerged in many WTO 
countries.
3  Hypothesis Development
3.1  Inward FDI Horizontal Productivity Spillovers and MNE Responses
FDI activity in a host country is generally expected to generate horizontal knowledge 
spillovers that will benefit the performance and productivity of local firms operating 
in the same industry (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008). One of the reasons that enable 
MNEs to engage in FDI and compete in a foreign market is their capability to access, 
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develop, transfer, and exploit advanced knowledge assets such as IPR (Almeida and 
Phene 2004). MNEs pool such IPR assets from their innovation activities at home 
and abroad (Chang et al. 2012; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000) and use them as the 
spearheads for successfully entering and competing internationally. The transfer of 
advanced IPR and other knowledge assets to their foreign affiliates enables MNEs 
to overcome the liability of foreignness in the host country through the exploitation 
of IPR assets that are more advanced than these of domestic firms. The transfer of 
MNE knowledge in a host country in the form of intangible assets such as patents, 
trademarks, and knowhow however, can allow domestic firms to benefit from the 
potential knowledge leakage attached to these assets and help them to enhance their 
productivity and competitiveness. Due to the public good nature of knowledge, once 
it is accessed, it can be transferred at zero or low marginal cost to more recipients. 
Accessing advanced IPR and knowhow can therefore enable domestic firms to ben-
efit from the use of an MNE’s knowledge and avoid the monetary liabilities to the 
legal owners of the IPR (Kogut and Zander 1993).
Knowledge spillovers from the FDI of MNEs in a host market can occur directly, 
in terms of knowledge that is leaked from the MNE, or indirectly through the expo-
sure of the domestic firms to the products and practices of the MNE. Knowledge 
can directly diffuse in a host country through employee mobility, when employees 
of the MNE in the host country move on to work for domestic firms (Berry 2017). 
This process allows the domestic firms to directly access the IPR and knowhow 
of the MNE and utilize it to improve their own practices and competitive offering 
(Aitken and Harrison 1999; Gorg and Strobl 2001). Domestic firms can also experi-
ence direct productivity spillovers by licensing-in the IPR assets of the MNEs or by 
entering in joint venture agreements with them. There are two main indirect chan-
nels with which domestic firms benefit from accessing the IP, knowledge and know-
how of MNEs: (a) the demonstration channel and (b) the competition channel (Gorg 
and Greenaway 2003; Liu et al. 2009; Yi et al. 2015). The demonstration channel 
relates to domestic firms’ reverse engineering and attempting to imitate the propri-
etary technology of foreign MNE affiliates (Gorg and Greenaway 2003; Meyer and 
Sinani 2005). The competition channel relates to the presence of MNEs in a host 
country, which leads to the intensification of the competition in the industry through 
the higher number of competitors and by introducing new ways of competing 
(Meyer and Sinani 2009). This helps domestic firms to increase their productivity 
by attempting to reduce their inefficiency and/or invest more in R&D and knowledge 
generation/acquisition. A domestic firm’s investment in R&D can also aim to invent 
around and develop similar (legally registered or unregistered) IPR assets to those of 
the MNE, while avoiding the legal infringement of the MNE’s IPR assets. In addi-
tion, domestic firms can seek to gain a license of the MNE’s advanced technology 
in exchange for a licensing fee and annual royalties. Licensing can allow a domestic 
firm to increase their productivity by legally accessing IPR assets while this is also 
beneficial for the MNE. The extent to which domestic firms can increase their pro-
ductivity will depend on their capability to absorb and reconfigure advanced knowl-
edge and knowhow (Cantwell 2017; Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Escribano et  al. 
2009).
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MNEs pursue two different approaches to safeguard against the leakage of 
their proprietary knowledge and reduce the unintended spillovers from the unau-
thorised exploitation of their IPR by domestic firms. The first approach relates 
to the development of internal mechanisms in the MNE’s subsidiary to control 
the extent of IPR and knowhow leakage (de Faria and Sofka 2010). Further to 
registering the IPR assets in the host country, such internal mechanisms include 
secrecy measures within the subsidiary and the use of complex designs that 
require other knowhow and expertise held outside the subsidiary (de Faria and 
Sofka 2010). In addition, to retain a tighter grip on the potential unintended leak-
age of parent firm knowledge, MNEs can employ expatriate managers, because of 
their corporate loyalties and knowledge of parent firm assets, priorities and rou-
tines, in the host country to facilitate the knowledge transfer to the subsidiary and 
implement IPR control policies within the subsidiary (Berry 2017).
The second approach relates to MNE attempts to limit the unintended spillo-
vers in cases that their proprietary IPR knowledge is found to be used by domes-
tic firms. In the process of identifying and fighting against IPR infringement, 
MNEs need to engage with the public enforcement agents including the judiciary, 
the police and customs agents (Bessen and Meurer 2008; Yang et al. 2008). The 
effectiveness of the public IPR enforcement agents in a host country can deter-
mine if e.g., police and customs agents will effectively prosecute a suspected IPR 
infringement case, and the extent to which the IPR law is applied in a timely, 
non-discriminatory, and effective manner to penalise domestic IPR infring-
ing firms (Ahammad et al. 2018; Papageorgiadis and Sofka, 2020). In countries 
where the MNEs are able to engage with public IPR enforcement agents and stop 
or punitively penalise IPR infringement with their support, the MNEs will be 
able to limit the unintended spillovers from unauthorised IPR exploitation, even 
if the proprietary IPR and knowhow of the MNE has been leaked to domestic 
companies.
While the effectiveness of public IPR enforcement agents in a host country can 
determine the extent to which domestic firms in the same industry benefit from 
spillovers, this element of the institutional fabric of host countries has not received 
much scholarly attention in the literature to date. Over the last years, a large number 
of studies focused on different host country and firm characteristics and examined 
their influence on the knowledge transfer and spillovers to domestic firms in a host 
country (Aitken and Harrison 1999; Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Blomstrom and 
Sjoholm 1999; Brouthers 2002; Meyer and Sinani 2009; Sjoholm 1999). However, 
there has been limited research on the role of the effectiveness of IPR systems in 
generating inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms (Arora 
2009). Existing studies in this area mainly focused on the role of the strength of IPR 
law in a host country in stimulating or discouraging horizontal productivity spillo-
vers from inward FDI and found mixed results (Iršová and Havránek 2013; Smeets 
and de Vaal 2016; Yi et al. 2015). Existing research therefore focused on one of the 
two elements of IPR systems, but did not consider the role of the effectiveness of 
public IPR enforcement agents, neither the way that public IPR enforcement may 
moderate the effect that the strength of IPR law has on inward FDI horizontal pro-
ductivity spillovers to domestic firms.
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3.2  IPR Law Protection and Inward FDI Horizontal Productivity Spillovers
The strength of IPR protection in terms of the availability of IPR law in a host coun-
try is a significant determinant of FDI activity (Branstetter et al. 2007; Khoury and 
Peng, 2011; Ushijima 2013) and investments on high value MNE activities (Berry 
2017) such as the establishment of R&D centres (Maskus et al. 2005). Strong IPR 
law protection in a host country can enable MNEs to formally register and trans-
fer their IPR assets and advanced technological and managerial know-how to their 
foreign affiliates (Branstetter 2006; Yi et al. 2015). MNEs are positively influenced 
by increases in the availability of IPR law in a host country and they are found to 
respond by increasing their patenting activity there (Khoury et  al. 2014). Their 
increased patenting activity relates to both IPRs already registered in their home 
country and innovations developed in the host country.
Since MNEs are institutional outsiders when entering a host country, they are 
expected to face high information costs due to their unfamiliarity with the local 
institutional environment and practices (Hennart 2012; Khoury et al. 2014). When 
MNEs find familiar aspects in the IPR systems of a host country such as strong IPR 
law protection, they perceive it as a positive signal that can enable them to register, 
legally protect, and potentially enforce their legal rights against IPR infringement 
(Khoury et al. 2014). This is especially the case in host countries with strong loca-
tion advantages (e.g., large market size, low cost or highly skilled labour) where 
accessing and benefiting from these advantages may be considered to be a priority 
for the overall success of the MNE. Strong IPR law protection is expected to lead 
MNEs to increase their patenting activity in a host country (Khoury et  al. 2014), 
thereby also increasing the amount and quality of IPR assets and knowhow trans-
ferred to the subsidiaries of the MNEs (Berry 2017). In contrast, domestic firms 
may not experience an increase in their patenting activities due to the strengthening 
of IPR law protection. Domestic firms are well embedded in the information net-
works of the country and they may see the strengthening of IPR law protection as 
merely a ‘window dressing’ for attracting FDI (Peng et al. 2017a, 2017b) and there-
fore do not respond to it positively. Despite this, strong IPR law protection in general 
offers an incentive to domestic firms to develop innovative capabilities aligned with 
their resource endowments and/or in areas that they are able to compete with market 
leaders (Teece 2017). This can further enhance their absorptive capacity and poten-
tially increase their ability to engage with MNE knowledge spillovers (Chen and 
Puttitanun 2005; Yi et al. 2015).
FDI inflow is expected to boost the quality and quantity of technology transferred 
to the host country in the form of IPR assets and knowhow, generating positive 
spillovers to the domestic firms. Domestic firms can directly (labour mobility chan-
nel) or indirectly (demonstration and competition channel) access the IPR of foreign 
firms. This is the case even if the subsidiaries of MNEs utilize internal mechanisms 
aimed to limit knowledge leakage. While the availability of IPR law protection ena-
bles the MNEs to position their IPR assets in the technological landscape of legally 
protected IPR, domestic firms can illegally access the know-how of foreign firms 
through IPR infringement. This is because the strength of IPR law in a country does 
not automatically constrain IPR infringement activities (Bessen and Meurer 2008; 
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Brander et  al. 2017). To stop IPR infringement, MNEs need to become aware of 
the infringement of their IPR by the competing firms, engage with the public IPR 
enforcement agents by attempting to gain their support, and rely on them to stop and 
penalise the infringers. We therefore expect that:
Hypothesis 1: The strength of IPR law protection in a host country positively 
affects the horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI to domestic 
firms.
3.3  Public IPR Enforcement and Inward FDI Horizontal Productivity Spillovers
The strength of public IPR enforcement of a host country can determine the extent 
to which domestic firms can improve their productivity by legally or illegally gain-
ing access to the IPR assets of MNEs. The ability of an MNE to effectively defend 
the IPR that it registers in and transfers to a host country against IPR infringement, 
depends on the effectiveness of public IPR enforcement agents. After transferring 
and actively engaging in the internal or external exploitation of their IPR assets, 
MNEs actively monitor the IPR landscape of the host country to identify the poten-
tial infringement of their rights (Oxley 1999). When a competitor infringes on a 
MNE’s IPR asset, the MNE can engage with the public IPR enforcement agents of 
the host country and aim to seize and desist the activities of the infringing party 
(Yang et al. 2008). The MNE can also aim for a preliminary injunction by taking the 
case to the judiciary through IPR litigation as well as engage with other public IPR 
enforcement agents such as customs and police to take legal actions (e.g., civil rem-
edies, boarder measures) against the infringing parties and stop them from continu-
ing the illegal activities (Keupp et al. 2010).
In countries where public IPR enforcement is strong, MNEs can expect that the 
enforcement agents will effectively deter the IPR infringement activities and that 
the IPR infringers will be effectively prosecuted, receiving punitive sanctions and 
penalties (Papageorgiadis and Sofka 2020; Papageorgiadis et al. 2014). This can act 
as a deterrent of IPR infringing activities, discouraging the opportunistic behaviour 
of domestic firms that might consider to infringe the IPR of an MNE but eventually 
refrain from doing so due to the high risk of being prosecuted and penalized. In con-
trast, in countries where public IPR enforcement is weak, even if an MNE pursues 
a litigation case against infringers, the firm will find it difficult and problematic to 
effectively enforce its rights in practice (Papageorgiadis et  al. 2019b, 2020; Yang 
et  al. 2008). This is because the judiciary may delay the delivery of a judgement 
on an IPR case and, if the defendant is found guilty, award penalties that are not 
punitive and/or of limited impact on the operations of the infringer (Brander et al. 
2017). Furthermore, other public IPR enforcement agents such as the police authori-
ties may not actively enforce the judiciary’s rulings or do so ineffectively, allow-
ing the IPR infringers to continue operating in a country. Therefore, in countries 
where public IPR enforcement is strong, MNEs can anticipate that they will be able 
to successfully defend their IPR in the case of IPR infringement. MNEs can limit the 
direct knowledge spillovers from former MNE employees illegally transferring their 
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acquired knowledge to a domestic firm as well as reduce the indirect spillovers from 
the demonstration channel (Agarwal et al. 2009).
While strong public IPR enforcement can curb FDI productivity spillovers to 
domestic firms from illegal channels, it is expected to boost the positive spillovers 
through the legal direct and indirect channels. With regards to the direct channels, 
strong public IPR enforcement levels can allow MNEs to confidently and efficiently 
utilize and monetize higher value IPR assets in external markets, through licensing-
out to non-affiliate firms and the formation of joint ventures with domestic firms 
(Branstetter 2006; Ivus et  al. 2017). Stronger levels of IPR enforcement provide 
confidence to the IPR owning MNEs that their rights will be effectively protected 
and defended in case of licensees infringing the IPR (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; 
Oxley 1999; Papageorgiadis et  al. 2013). Therefore, domestic firms collaborating 
with MNEs can increase their productivity by legally accessing the IPR assets, and 
advanced technological and managerial know-how of the MNEs leading to positive 
FDI horizontal productivity spillovers (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008; Smarzynska-
Javorcik 2004b). The legal indirect channels to positive FDI productivity spillovers 
occur through the competition effect. The exploitation of high value IPR assets by 
MNEs in a host country can offer them a competitive advantage against their domes-
tic competitors in terms of cost and differentiation (advanced products). This can 
apply strong competitive pressure to the domestic firms which need to react and 
adapt their strategy in order not to be marginalized. Strong public IPR enforcement 
conditions in a country incentivizes domestic firms to develop their innovative capa-
bilities by engaging in R&D activities (Chen and Puttitanun, 2005; Yi et al. 2015). 
Domestic firms can continue to reverse engineer the more advanced technological 
assets of MNEs but are expected to engage in more complex innovation activities 
since they need to manoeuvre around the technological landscape and avoid infring-
ing the IPR of MNEs (Maskus 2005). This can lead them to upgrade their capa-
bilities and IPR assets and improve their productivity. Overall, domestic competitor 
firms are expected to benefit from accessing the advanced IPR of MNEs through 
the legal direct and indirect channels and improve their productivity. We therefore 
expect that:
Hypothesis 2: The strength of public IPR enforcement in a host country posi-
tively affects the horizontal productivity spillovers from inward FDI to domes-
tic firms.
3.4  The Role of Public IPR Enforcement on the Effect of IPR Law Protection 
on Horizontal Productivity Spillovers from Inward FDI
Although the two elements of IPR systems individually are expected to have a posi-
tive impact on the direct and indirect channels of FDI horizontal spillovers, strong 
IPR law protection supported by strong public IPR enforcement, as set out by 
TRIPS, has the potential to provide strong market power to an MNE and affect the 
industry dynamics in a host country (Brander et al. 2017). Strong IPR enforcement 
can enable foreign MNEs to gain a dominant, nearly monopolistic, position in a host 
market with strong IPR law protection by transferring their entire IPR portfolios and 
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seeking to appropriate them by blocking competition (Maskus 2000; Smeets and de 
Vaal 2016). For example, an MNE that holds a number of interlocking patents pro-
tecting the development of a technological product, can aggressively seek to halt the 
exploitation of similar substitute products by domestic competitors, in the anticipa-
tion that the strong public IPR enforcement will support its strategy (Grimpe and 
Hussinger 2013). This specific type of favourable IPR appropriability conditions 
would not have been possible in other types of IPR systems where IPR law protec-
tion is strong, but public IPR enforcement is relatively weak (and vice versa).
Such IPR conditions can limit the horizontal productivity spillovers from inward 
FDI to domestic firms via both the direct and indirect channels. With regards to 
the direct channels, the more effective enforcement of their IPR in the host coun-
try can enable MNEs to achieve higher prices when exploiting their IPR (Bessen 
and Meurer 2008). This suggests that MNEs have the option to exploit their IPR 
assets internally. For example, under such conditions, they can import new technol-
ogies that are rooted in their unique organisational and local environments. Such 
imported technologies tend to be more complex and difficult to duplicate by oth-
ers, which enables them to charge a premium price for their products and/or fur-
ther strengthen their market position in the host country (Barney 2001; Brandt and 
Thun 2010), leaving limited scope for technological productivity spillovers. MNEs 
can also appropriate the returns from their innovations or license-out their IPR to 
non-affiliate domestic firms by charging premium royalty fees (Maskus 2000). This 
means domestic firms who pay a premium license to gain direct legal access to the 
MNE’s IPR assets (available to them because of strong IPR law protection) are 
likely to operate with thinner margins that impact their productivity in terms of e.g., 
the amount of financial resources available for marketing activities or the extent of 
reinvesting in research and development. Both options restrict the horizontal pro-
ductivity spillovers and the associated benefits to domestic firms. Stronger public 
IPR enforcement is also expected to limit the knowledge and knowhow spillovers 
from the opportunistic behaviour of former employees of MNEs who are aware that 
their former employer will seek to enforce the restrictive contracts signed when they 
joined the MNE (Agarwal et al. 2009).
The indirect channels of inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domes-
tic firms are also expected to be more constrained by stronger public IPR enforce-
ment levels in countries where IPR law protection is strong. The strong market 
power of MNEs resulting from stronger public IPR enforcement levels is expected to 
divert more market demand away from domestic firms leading to a decline in their 
profitability and productivity (Aitken and Harrison 1999). The near monopolistic 
position of MNEs can limit the ability of domestic firms to respond to the com-
petitive pressures by investing in research and development, or finding alternative 
approaches to increase their market share (Iršová and Havránek 2013; Smeets and 
de Vaal 2016). Importantly, the prospect of competing in a tight technological land-
scape where a domestic firm’s investments on R&D are more likely to be jeopard-
ised by MNEs’ domination and IPR infringement actions, acts as a disincentive for 
domestic firms (Branstetter and Saggi 2011; Maskus 2000). Research on innova-
tion at the firm level has shown that innovation (and imitation) increasingly requires 
combing technological components and complementary knowledge from multiple 
 D. Christopoulou et al.
1 3
sources (Leiponen and Helfat 2010). The tight control of key technologies and asso-
ciated complementary knowledge by MNEs can drive the innovation cost curve to a 
point that the costs of pursing innovation override its benefits (Xia and Liu 2017). 
This is also the case for IPR imitating/infringing domestic firms, which can choose 
to divert their focus to production activities of low R&D intensive or/and low valued 
added, in order to avoid the anticipated sanctions and penalties.
In sum, strong IPR law protection incentivises foreign MNEs to transfer their IPR 
assets to the host country and stimulates domestic firms to develop innovative capa-
bilities to compete with market leaders. When this is coupled with strong public 
IPR enforcement however, negative effects may increase due to reduced competition 
from the higher blocking of rival entries by MNEs, higher cost for accessing and/or 
developing the technology by local firms etc., thus reducing the scope for positive 
inward FDI productivity spillovers to domestic firms. We therefore expect that:
Hypothesis 3: Strong public IPR enforcement in a country weakens the posi-
tive relationship between IPR law protection and horizontal productivity spill-
overs from inward FDI to domestic firms.
4  Methodology
We performed a meta-analysis by extracting the findings from existing primary 
empirical research and using the extracted data to assess the effect of the strength of 
IPR law protection and the strength of public IPR enforcement on inward FDI hori-
zontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms. Meta-analysis provides a systematic 
approach to reviewing an existing body of literature by statistically integrating the 
results of a large set of studies on a particular topic, in one single empirical analysis 
(Lipsey and Wilson 2001; Mayer-Haug et al. 2013; Meyer and Sinani 2005). Moreo-
ver, in research topics where existing empirical studies provide inconclusive results, 
a meta-analysis can be “a powerful tool to identify the moderating effects of con-
textual variables and thus to establish the boundary conditions of scientific knowl-
edge” (Meyer and Sinani 2009, p. 1076). Our study builds on and extends the work 
of the two existing meta-analyses in the area of inward FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers to domestic firms, by Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Iršová and Havránek 
(2013). We extend their work by considering the separate effect of the second ele-
ment of IPR systems, the strength of public IPR enforcement, as well as the moder-
ating effect of public IPR enforcement on the relationship between IPR law protec-
tion and FDI horizontal productivity spillovers.
4.1  Selection of Primary Literature
Following the guidelines for meta-analyses by Havranek et  al. (2020) we adopted 
a four-stage approach in the process of selecting the most appropriate primary lit-
erature and establishing a comprehensive database for this study. First, we identi-
fied studies on inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms (pub-
lished and unpublished) in the reference lists of the two previous meta-analytical 
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studies by Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Iršová and Havránek (2013) and of the 
review paper by Crespo and Fontoura (2007). Second, we expanded our search with 
the use of keywords and searched in three established scientific databases (Proquest, 
Science direct, EconLit databases) and the scientific search engine Google Scholar. 
In line with the keywords used by Meyer and Sinani (2009), we used combinations 
of the following keywords: “foreign direct investment/FDI spillover*”, “foreign 
direct investment/FDI horizontal spillover*”, “productivity spillover*”, “productiv-
ity horizontal spillover*”, “knowledge spillover*”, “technolog*spillover*”, “knowl-
edge transfer spillover*”, and “knowledge transfer horizontal spillover*”. These two 
stages yield 112 studies on inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domes-
tic firms. Third, we applied the following inclusion criteria to ensure the data avail-
ability for all the variables used in our study: (1) studies with at least one estimation 
on inward horizontal spillovers, (2) studies with regression coefficients, sample size, 
standard errors and t-statistics, (3) studies covering the years 1998–2011 and (4) 
studies specific to one or more of 49 developed and developing countries covered 
in Papageorgiadis et al. (2014). Criteria 3 and 4 are applied because the public IPR 
enforcement measure is adopted from Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) and is only avail-
able for this specific time period and country range. This reduced our sample cover-
age from 112 to 47 (published and unpublished) empirical studies on inward FDI 
horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms, of which 20 studies identified 
in stage 1 and 27 in stage 2. Finally, we extracted data on the variables, including 
outcome statistics, sample sizes, study characteristics and also collected the data for 
the country level variables such as trade openness, tertiary education, R&D expendi-
tures and financial development. Table 1 provides a summary of the characteristics 
of each of the studies that are included in the dataset, in terms of the country of 
focus, the year studied and the level of focus of each study. Overall, we collected 
1560 inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms estimates, as 
reported in 47 empirical studies.
4.2  Dependent Variable and Estimation Method
In this study, we use a categorical effect size dependent variable to distinguish 
between significantly negative, insignificant and significantly positive estimates of 
inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms. Due to the diverse 
set of measures and estimation methods used in existing inward FDI horizontal pro-
ductivity spillovers to domestic firms studies in the literature, meta-analysis studies 
on inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms normally regress 
the t statistics, instead of inward FDI presence variable coefficients, on a set of mod-
erators (Gorg and Strobl 2001; Meyer and Sinani 2005; Wooster and Diebel 2010). 
However, using t statistics may lead to erroneous inference regarding the spillovers. 
In order to avoid this potential pitfall, we classify the estimates based on ‘sign and 
significance’ into three categories: significantly positive, insignificantly different 
from zero and significantly negative based on t values and p values reported in each 
study. This means that the effect size is captured by a categorical variable that indi-
cates the probability of study outcomes at each level. This approach has been widely 
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Table 1  The empirical studies on inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms that are 
included in the meta-analysis
Study Country Data year Aggregation
Hamida (2013) Switzerland 2001–2004 Firm level
Hamida and Gugler (2009) Switzerland 1998–2001 Firm level
Blake et al. (2009) China 2000 Firm level
Buckley et al. (2007a) China 2001 Industry level
Buckley et al. (2007b) China 2001 Industry level
Chang and Xu (2008) China 1998–2005 Firm level
Chang et al. (2007) China 2002–2005 Firm level
Crespo et al. (2007) Portugal 1996–2000 Firm level
Du et al. (2012) China 1998–2007 Firm level
Erdogan (2011) Turkey 2004–2008 Firm level
Fu (2012) UK 1998–2004 Firm level
Gersl (2008) Czech Rep 2002–2005 Firm level
Gersl et al. (2008) Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Romania
2000–2005 Industry level
Girma and Gong (2008) China 1999–2002 Firm level
Gonçalves (2004) Brazil 1997–2000 Firm level
Hagemejer and Kolasa (2011) Poland 1996–2005 Firm level
Halpern and Muraközy (2007) Hungary 1996–2003 Firm level
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) Romania 1998–2003 Firm level
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) Romania 1998–2003 Firm level
Javorcik et al. (2004) Romania 1998–2000 Firm level
Jeon et al. (2013) China 1998–2007 Firm level
Khalifah and Adam (2009) Malaysia 2000–2004 Firm level
Marcin (2008) Poland 1996–2003 Firm level
Laenarts and Merlevede (2011) Romania 1996–2005 Firm level
Liang (2017) China 1998–2005 Firm level
Liu et al. (2009) China 1998–2001 Firm level
Lutz and Talavera (2004) Ukraine 1998–1999 Industry level
Mariotti et al. (2011) Italy 1999–2005 Firm level
Mebratie and Bedi (2013) S. Africa 2003 Firm level
Merlevede and Schoors (2007) Romania 1996–2001 Firm level
Merlevede and Schoors (2009) Romania 1996–2001 Firm level
Merlevede et al. (2014) Romania 1996–2005 Industry level
Nicolini and Resmini (2010) Poland 1998–2003 Firm level
Qiu et al. (2009) China 2001–2006 Industry level
Reganati and Sica (2007) Italy 1997–2002 Firm level
Sarkar and Lai (2009) India 2005 Firm level
Schoors and van der Tol (2002) Hungary 1997–1998 Firm level
Sun (2011) China 2003 Firm level
Tang (2008) China 1998–2001 Firm level
Tian (2007) China 1996–1999 Industry level
Tomohara and Yokota (2006) Thailand 1999–2001 Firm level
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applied in the literature (Card et al. 2010; de Groot et al. 2016; Koetse et al. 2009) 
with the use of ordered probit models (Koetse et al. 2009). Specifically, the model 
assumes the presence of a latent variable, in our study—CSig∗
ij
 , that is explained by a 
set of moderators (independent variables):
in which Zk,ij is a vector of independent variables included; εij the error term that is 
normally and iid distributed; and lower case k, I, j refers to the kth variable, ith esti-
mate and jth study respectively. The latent variable CSig∗
ij
 is constructed as follows:
Category A: y = 0 if an estimate of inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers 
to domestic firms is negative and statistically significant (applying 5% signifi-
cance level),
Category B: y = 1 if an estimate of inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers 
to domestic firms is statistically insignificant (either negative or positive, 5% sig-
nificance level),
Category C: y = 2 if an estimate of inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers 
to domestic firms is positive and statistically significant (5% significance level).
4.3  Independent Variables
To approximate for the strength of IPR law protection we employ the widely used 
index of patent protection strength developed by Park (2008). This index measures 
the availability of patent related legislation in 122 countries for the years 1960–2005 
(Par 2008). The scores of the index range from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating 
stronger levels of patent law protection in a country (Ginarte and Park 1997). It is 
important to note that the focus of this index is on the availability of patent laws and 
legal mechanisms (such as the laws that enable the enforcement of IPR), however it 
does not capture the level of effectiveness with which the law is enforced in practice 
by public IPR enforcement agents (Arora 2009; Brander et al. 2017; Papageorgiadis 








Table 1  (continued)
Study Country Data year Aggregation
Wang and Yu (2007) China 2001 Industry level
Wang and Zhao (2008) China 2000–2002 Industry level
Wang et al. (2012) China 1998–2006 Industry level
Wei and Liu (2006) China 1998–2001 Industry level
Xu and Sheng (2012) China 2000–2003 Industry level
Zhang et al. (2010) China 1998–2003 Firm level
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To approximate for the strength of public IPR enforcement we employ the IPSS 
index developed by Papageorgiadis et  al. (2014). The IPSS measures the level of 
transaction costs that patent owners face when engaging with the public patent 
enforcement agents in an IPR system. It is a longitudinal composite measure that 
provides annual scores for the time period 1998–2011, for 48 countries. The index 
scores range from 0 to 10 with high scores indicating to patent systems where pub-
lic patent enforcement agents effectively implement patent law in practice and low 
scores indicate to countries where public patent enforcement levels are weak (Papa-
georgiadis et al. 2014). It is important to note that the IPSS is a composite indicator 
that uses ten secondary variables to proxy for the transaction costs that patent own-
ers face when engaging with ten different components of public patent enforcement 
in a country. It consists of three constructs informed by transaction costs theory, 
namely: (i) monitoring costs determined by the effectiveness and strength of police 
and border enforcement agents as well as influenced by the societal attitudes and 
public commitment towards the enforcement of patent rights; (ii) property rights 
protection costs related to the strength, impartiality, and effectiveness of judicial 
aspects of a patent institution as well as to the strength of judicial enforcement in 
a country; and (iii) servicing costs related to the quality and effectiveness of public 
agencies that are responsible to effectively administer patent laws and regulations or 
private companies that enable the administration of patents within a country. There-
fore, using this index enables us to go beyond approximating for only one aspect of 
the strength of public patent enforcement, and allows us to capture the combined 
effectiveness of this multifaceted element of IPR systems.
4.4  Control Variables
Our meta-analytical model includes four different groups of control variables: (a) 
country level effects, (b) study specific characteristics, (c) model specific character-
istics, and (d) estimation method characteristics of the studies in the dataset. First, 
we incorporate three country level variables that are theoretically expected to have 
a positive effect on the productivity of domestic firms, namely: (i) financial devel-
opment (Iršová and Havránek 2013), (ii) labour quality using two proxies (R&D 
expenditure and tertiary education), and (iii) trade openness (as an indicator of tech-
nological inflows in host country) (Iršová and Havránek 2013; Meyer and Sinani 
2009; Wooster and Diebel 2010). Second, we control for the characteristics of the 
studies that comprise the dataset. Differences in the research design across studies 
may have an effect on the size of the coefficient found in the studies on inward FDI 
horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms (Gorg and Greenaway 2003; 
Gorg and Strobl 2001; de Groot et al. 2016; Meyer and Sinani 2009). We therefore 
consider the effect of: (i) data characteristics with two variables (cross-sectional/
panel data and industry/firm level data); (ii) the length of the period covered in 
the study (time span); (iii) sample size, the number of observations used for each 
estimation; and (iv) two model specification characteristics: (1) if a study controls 
for the technological gap between domestic and foreign firms (technological gap), 
using one dummy and (2) foreign presence measurement in the model specification 
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characteristics of a study, using two dummies, one for studies using the share in 
employment and the other for studies using foreign equity share in an industry (Gorg 
and Greenaway 2003). Third, we introduce five dummy variables to control for 
the estimation method used in the studies in our dataset such as; (a) Olley-Pakes, 
(b) OLS, (c) GMM, (d) year fixed and (e) sector fixed. Fourth, we introduce three 
dummy variables to control for the effect of publication characteristics on inward 
FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms namely; (a) peer reviewed 
articles (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012), (b) inward FDI vertical productivity 
spillovers (Smarzynska-Javorcik 2004a, 2004b), and (c) Amadeus database (Eapen 
2013). Table 2 provides the definition of all the variables included in the study and 
the data sources used to measure them.
5  Results and Discussion
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of all the variables included in the empiri-
cal estimation and Table 4 the correlation table. The correlations among the vari-
ables is low. The average value of the VIF test is 1.23 and the correlation between 
public IPR enforcement and IPR law protection is 0.125 and statistically insignifi-
cant. Overall, multicollinearity does not seem to be a problem. 
Table 5 presents the ordered probit estimates. These estimates are accompanied 
with their corresponding marginal effects which show the change in the probability 
of finding a specific outcome (Koetse et al. 2009; Verbeek 2017). Since the results of 
the marginal effects are fully consistent with the ordered probit estimates, we focus 
our discussion of findings mainly based on the ordered probit estimates for brevity. 
With regards to the results in relation to hypothesis 1, we find that the strength of 
IPR law protection has a positive and statistically significant (4.097, p < 0.001 in 
Model 1) effect on inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms. 
This finding therefore supports hypothesis 1 regarding the positive impact of IPR 
law protection strength on the effect of inward FDI on the productivity spillovers 
to domestic competitors. This result is not surprising given that the signing of the 
TRIPS agreement in 1995 was underpinned by the expectation that improving the 
strength of IPR law protection in a country will boost FDI and technology transfer 
levels globally. As the result related to Hypothesis 1 reveals, domestic firms in the 
host countries benefit from this boost by gaining access to more advanced IPR assets 
and improving their productivity. This result however challenges the findings of the 
previous meta-analytic study by Iršová and Havránek (2013) who found that the IPR 
law protection reduces the magnitude of inward FDI horizontal productivity spillo-
vers to domestic firms and Smeets and de Vaal (2016) who found an insignificant 
relationship. The discrepancy in the results may be due to the non-consideration 
of the effects of public IPR enforcement strength in their empirical analyses. This 
explanation is consistent with Smeets and de Vaal’s (2016) acknowledgement that 
the variation in national IPR system strength is limited in their sample of countries 
because they are all (fairly) well developed and have more standardised de jure pro-
tection, as reflected in the IPR indicators used.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 D. Christopoulou et al.
1 3
The testing of hypothesis 2 reveals that the strength of public IPR enforcement 
has a positive and statistically significant (3.693, p < 0.001 in Model 1) impact on 
inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms. While the role of 
the strength of the public IPR enforcement element of IPR systems in stimulating 
inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms has been ignored in 
the existing literature, the results of our study showcase a significant direct positive 
effect. This provides support to the expectation that strong public IPR enforcement 
can significantly support the establishment of lawful co-operation and knowledge 
transfer between MNEs and competitor domestic firms, boosting the productivity 
spillovers of the latter. This finding reveals a new IPR institutional mechanism that 
affects inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms, demonstrat-
ing the importance for future studies in the literature to consider the theoretically 
distinct effects of the strength of public IPR enforcement. In addition, this result pro-
vides further support to the perspective of Brander et al. (2017) who conceptually 
highlighted the differences between the strength of the availability of IPR law pro-
tection as it appears on the books and the actual strength of public IPR enforcement, 
Table 3  Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Csig 1524 0.41 2.49 − 8.50 9.71
Public IPR enforcement 1567 4.26 1.08 3.40 8.85
IPR law protection 1567 3.41 0.51 2.12 4.60
Public IPR enforcement × IPR law 
protection
1567 14.73 5.75 8.90 39.68
Trade openness 1560 61.23% 24.32% 20.02% 205.54%
Financial development 1566 77.21% 53.36% 15.59% 192.66%
Tertiary education 1566 22.86% 14.95% 0.00% 59.72%
R&D 1566 0.76% 0.35% 0.26% 2.68%
Cross sectional data 1567 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Industry level data 1567 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Time span 1567 6.70 2.85 1.00 10.00
Ln no. of observations 1566 10.31 2.56 3.30 15.09
Foreign presence_employment 1567 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Foreign presence_equity 1567 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Technological gap 1567 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Vertical spillovers 1567 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00
Olley-Pakes 1567 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
OLS 1567 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
GMM 1567 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Sector fixed 1567 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
Year fixed 1567 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Publication 1566 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Amadeus 1567 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
1 3
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Public IPR enforcement 3.693*** − 0.836** − 0.365 1.201*
(− 5.71) (− 2.63) (− 1.72) (− 2.46)
IPR law protection 4.097*** − 0.927** − 0.405 1.332**
(− 5.52) (− 2.64) (− 1.77) (− 2.51)
Public IPR enforcement × IPR law 
protection
− 0.877*** 0.199** 0.867 − 0.285*
(− 5.73) (− 2.62) (− 1.74) (− 2.47)
Trade openness 0.317 − 0.072 − 0.031 0.103
− 1.23 (− 0.69) (− 0.68) (− 0.7)
Tertiary education 2.82*** − 0.640 − 0.279 0.919
− 4.35 (− 1.35) (− 1.13) (− 1.31)
Financial development − 0.779*** 0.176* 0.077 − 0.253**
(− 3.45) − 2.33 − 1.55 (− 2.15)
R&D expenditure 0.482* − 0.109 − 0.048 0.157
− 2.1 (− 1.13) (− 1.00) (− 1.11)
Cross sectional data − 0.288 0.065 0.029 − 0.094
(− 1.13) (− 0.5) (− 0.54) (− 0.52)
Industry-level data 1.181*** − 0.267** − 0.118* 0.384**
− 5.75 (− 2.59) (− 1.64) (− 2.37)
Ln no. of observations 0.0006 − 0.0001 − 0.0001 0.0002
− 0.02 (− 0.01) (− 0.01) (− 0.01)
Time span − 0.125*** 0.284* 0.012 − 0.041*
(− 4.79) (− 2.29) (− 1.69) (− 2.23)
Foreign presence_employment − 0.267* 0.060 0.026 − 0.087
(− 2.20) (− 1.12) (− 1.02) (− 1.11)
Foreign presence_equity 0.730*** − 0.165* − 0.072* 0.237*
− 6.11 (− 2.68) (− 2.24) − 2.9
Technological gap − 0.856*** 0.194* 0.085 − 0.278*
(− 4.00) (− 2.12) (− 1.62) (− 2.08)
Olley-Pakes − 0.396** 0.090 0.039 − 0.129
(− 3.01) (− 1.4) (− 1.33) (− 1.43)
OLS − 0.741*** 0.168* 0.073 0.241*
(− 7.08) (− 2.38) (− 1.72) (− 2.31)
GMM − 1.101*** 0.249** 0.109** − 0.358*
(− 4.87) (− 2.32) (− 1.56) (− 2.15)
Year fixed − 0.741*** 0.168*** 0.733 − 0.241***
(− 6.69) (− 3.18) (− 2.21) (− 3.29)
Sector fixed 0.381* − 0.086 − 0.038 0.124
− 2.38 (− 0.80) (− 0.68) (− 0.77)
Publication − 0.461** 0.104 0.046 − 0.150
(− 3.66) (− 1.68) (1.3) (− 1.61)
Amadeus 0.644*** − 0.146 − 0.064 0.210
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as well as the potential benefits that host countries experience from the strengthen-
ing of public IPR enforcement.
With regards to hypothesis 3, we find that strong public IPR enforcement weak-
ens the positive relationship between IPR law protection and inward FDI horizon-
tal productivity spillovers to domestic firms (− 0.877, p < 0.001 in Model 1). The 
results therefore support hypothesis 3 and reveal a second previously unexplored 
institutional mechanism of the functioning and effects of IPR systems. In countries 
where both IPR law protection and public IPR enforcement are strong, MNEs enjoy 
stronger market power than in countries with strong IPR law protection but rela-
tively weak public IPR enforcement (and vice versa). In such IPR systems, domestic 
firms, on the one hand, can be restricted to competing in a tight technological land-
scape that restricts them from responding to the competitive pressures, given that 
investments in R&D may be endangered by IPR litigation activity from the MNEs. 
On the other hand, they have less negotiating power when attempting to collabo-
rate and achieve a suitable licensing rate for accessing the IPR assets of an MNE, 
which has a negative impact on their productivity. As a result, domestic firms may 
also devote less effort in exploring tacit knowledge and developing organisational 
routines for innovation. This finding reconciles previous positive and negative asser-
tions (e.g., Iršová and Havránek 2013; Smeets and de Vaal 2016; Yi et al. 2015) in 
the literature on the relationship between IPR protection and inward FDI horizontal 
productivity spillovers to domestic firms. Overall, the findings suggest that future 
studies need to consider the effects of the two elements of an IPR system simultane-
ously on inward FDI productivity spillovers to domestic firms and other economic 
phenomena (depending on the focus of a study).
The results relating to the effect of the control variables are mainly in line with the 
findings in the existing literature. With regards to the country level variables, finan-
cial development has a significant negative effect whereas both proxies of labour 
quality (tertiary education and R&D expenditure) are found to have a significant 
positive effect on inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic firms 
(in line with: Iršová and Havránek 2013). However, trade openness is found to have 
an insignificant effect. With respect to the study specific characteristics, the indus-
try/firm level variable of data characteristics has a positive effect on the dependent 
variable (in line with Meyer and Sinani 2009) while the cross-sectional/panel data 
variable is found to have an insignificant effect. Furthermore, the estimation char-
acteristics (time span) has a significant negative effect, but the publication sample 
Table 5  (continued)
t statistics in parentheses







− 3.36 (− 1.30) (− 1.14) (− 1.28)
Vertical spillovers − 0.109 0.025 0.011 − 0.0351
(− 0.72) (− 0.36) (− 0.35) (− 0.36)
Number of observations 1560
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size (number of observations) is found to have an insignificant effect. With regards 
to the model specification variables, we find that studies using proxies of techno-
logical gap and foreign presence in employment have a significant negative effect on 
the dependent variable. The use of foreign presence in equity variables however, is 
found to have a positive effect. With regards to the control variables relating to the 
estimation methods, we find that the use of Olley-Pakes, OLS, GMM and year fixed 
effect estimations have a negative effect whereas the sector fixed effect estimation 
method variable is found to have a positive effect. Finally, with regards to the three 
variables capturing the publication characteristics of existing studies, we find that 
the publication variable (publication in peer reviewed journal) has a significant neg-
ative effect, the Amadeus database a significant positive effect, and the inward FDI 
vertical productivity spillovers to domestic firms variable an insignificant effect.
6  Conclusions
This paper builds on and extends the meta-analytical work on inward FDI horizon-
tal productivity spillovers to domestic firms of Meyer and Sinani (2009) and Iršová 
and Havránek (2013) by incorporating in the theoretical and empirical framework 
the distinct direct and moderating effect of the strength of public IPR enforce-
ment in a host country. Although the public enforcement element of IPR systems 
has increased in importance in the years after the signing of the TRIPS agreement 
(Brander et  al. 2017; USTR 2017), studies on inward FDI horizontal productivity 
spillovers to domestic firms have only considered the direct effect of the strength 
of IPR law protection to proxy for the overall effect of IPR systems, finding mixed 
results (Iršová and Havránek 2013; Smeets and de Vaal 2016; Yi et al. 2015). We 
argue that the mixed empirical evidence in the existing literature may be due to the 
non-consideration of the strength of public IPR enforcement and overestimating the 
effect of the strength of IPR law protection in a country. Both issues can introduce 
bias to the results of existing studies.
The results of our study reveal that the strength of public IPR enforcement has a 
direct positive effect on inward FDI horizontal productivity spillovers to domestic 
firms. Furthermore, we find that strong levels of public IPR enforcement negatively 
moderate the effect of strong IPR law protection on inward FDI horizontal produc-
tivity spillovers to domestic firms. This result showcases that in countries where 
MNEs are able to receive strong legal protection for their IPR assets and can effec-
tively enforce their IPR in case of infringement, they are expected to gain strong 
market power in their respective industries and stifle the productivity of domestic 
firms. Therefore, the results of the study identify two new institutional mechanisms 
that were previously unknown to the literature. This reconciles the diverging asser-
tions and mixed results found by previous studies, since these focused on only one 
of the two elements that comprise the strength of IPR systems, this of the strength 
of IPR law protection. The results of the study highlight the need to recalibrate the 
theoretical and empirical focus of future studies on FDI productivity spillovers to 
domestic firms by considering the direct and indirect effects of the strength of public 
IPR enforcement. This is especially the case for studies focusing on the effect of 
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IPR systems in the years after the signing and implementation of the TRIPS agree-
ment which altered the institutional conditions in the IPR systems of WTO countries 
globally.
Given that the strengthening of the two elements of IPR systems continues to be 
an important aspect in the international policy making negotiations and national pol-
icies, the results of this study have important policy making implications (FT 2018). 
Our findings suggest that the strengthening of both IPR law protection and public 
IPR enforcement in a country are expected to boost inward FDI horizontal produc-
tivity spillovers to domestic firms. Countries with strong book-law protection and 
public IPR enforcement are expected to benefit in terms of productivity, especially 
in relation to accessing the IPR assets of foreign MNEs. However, policy makers 
need to be cognizant of the off-setting effect of strong IPR law protection and public 
IPR enforcement on inward FDI spillovers and monitor closely the strengthening 
of public IPR enforcement in their country to timely identify when the productivity 
spillovers start to be hindered by a potential technological monopoly of MNEs. This 
can be done through the monitoring of the overall functioning of specific industries 
by e.g., monitoring the number of IPRs owned by MNEs, large firms or/and busi-
ness groups and the number of IPR litigation cases taking place within an industry 
and the way that the judiciary, customs and police enforcement agents behave in 
cases where an MNE’s allegation that its IPR is infringed by a domestic firm’s R&D 
activity is exaggerated. In areas where the link between IPR protection and technol-
ogy transfer and diffusion breaks down, policy makers should consider the options 
of moderate protection, such as shortening protection period and imposing mainte-
nance fee for patents that are not practiced but owned for pre-emptive purposes.
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